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Compulsory Conciliation in Canada 
Do WeNeed It? 
John D. Misick 
This paper tries to find support for the proposition that 
a free system of conciliation would be (a) more effective and 
(b) les s costly in the long run than a compulsory one. 
In no industrialized democracy, with the possible exception of 
Australia, are labour and management relations so dépendent on 
govemment intervention as in Canada. Many otherwise negotiable 
issues, including pensions, vacations, wages, fringe benefits, hours 
of work, working conditions, grievance and arbitration procédures and 
the right to strike or lock out are subject to various forms of significant 
législative or administrative interférence. We Canadians therefore 
can probably claim the dubious distinction of enacting more pages of 
législation and régulation per union member than any other country in 
the free world. The Canadian législative syndrome is a creeping disease 
which alarms a few observers but tends to give most of us a sensé of 
control over our destiny. Far from being a legitimate cause for comfort, 
its main effects are (1) to systematically and progressively destroy 
free collective bargaining, (2) to divert the efforts of labour and 
management into lobbying and other forms of political action, (3) to 
encourage the multiplication of govemment bureaucrats, (4) to foster 
increased défiance of the laws governing labour relations, and (5) to 
make the labour management field a happy hunting ground for lawyers, 
politicians, académies, reporters and others with no knowledge of or 
stake in the process. Generally speaking, the only suggestions thèse 
onlookers make for changing whatever at a given moment appears to 
be wrong with Canadian industrial relations are additions to the 
législation already on the books. The basic premise in their thinking is 
that there is nothing wrong with our laws which cannot be remedied 
by adding to the existing pile of législation. 
It becomes clearer with each passing year that législative action 
has not been successful in giving Canadians a system of labour-
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management relations which is more effective than that which has 
evolved in countries where there is less government interférence. The 
United States, Germany, and, more particularly, Sweden and the other 
Scandinavian countries rely on labour and management to solve their 
own problems, with the government as concerned spectator and, where 
absolutely necessary, as impartial umpire. Législation establishes a 
framework within which the two parties must operate. The form and 
content of the relationship is left largely to the parties to work out as 
best they can. While there are significant différences between the U.S. 
and Scandinavian models, they both differ materially from the Cana-
dian in their reliance on free collective bargaining. Sweden, with the 
freest System of ail, enjoys among western nations the highest degree 
of labour management harmony, the highest standard of living and a 
remarkable record for productivity and efficiency. 
While it would be irresponsible to propose that the Canadian 
Industrial relations System should imitate that of any other country, 
there are useful lessons to be drawn from expérience elsewhere. One 
lesson seems to be that less, rather than more, législation breeds 
healthy labour management relations. We would do well to ask our-
selves whether the heavy burden of Canadian government intervention 
has not become a threat to our unions, our industry and the institution 
of free collective bargaining. It is therefore time we started considering 
seriously which part of our législative framework should be retained 
for its positive value and which should be dismantled because it is 
senseless, unnecessary, costly, counter-productive or dangerous. 
High on the list of unnecessary législation is that sacred Canadian 
cow, compulsory conciliation. Compulsory conciliation is a législative 
device which proposes that the public interest must be represented in 
collective bargaining where negotiations hâve failed. Its justification 
must rest primarily on its capacity to foster industrial harmony. If it 
succeeds in this primary task, it should do so at less cost than that of 
other options which accomplish the primary objective equally well. 
The use of compulsory conciliation in Canadian Labour Relations 
practice dates back to the beginning of this century, having been 
first enshrined in fédéral législation in 1903.l Provincial labour légis-
lation, starting at a much later date, foliowed the fédéral pattera in 
1
 Both the Railway Labour Disputes Act of 1903 and the Industrial Disputes In-
vestigation Act of 1907 made provisions for compulsory conciliation. The latteir outlawed 
strikes or lockouts pending completion of conciliation procédures. 
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the case of ail but one jurisdiction (Saskatchewan) which made no 
provision for compulsory intervention in negotiations. 
The post-war fédéral model, to which most provinces adhered, 
called for a two-stage conciliation process, in which the first stage was 
mandatory in the event of a breakdown in negotiations and the second 
was semi-automatic but allowed some discretionary powers to the 
Minister of Labour.2 This pattern was generally accepted until the 
early sixties, by which time it had become apparent to many that the 
disadvantages of conciliation boards far outweighed whatever benefits 
they might offer.3 The fédéral government and most provinces even-
tually amended their législation so as to discourage what was viewed 
as the excessive reliance on boards. No conclusive évidence was or 
is available to substantiate the arguments for or against this change 
in législation. As with so much that is done in the labour relations 
field, the policy makers followed their hunch. 
Further questioning of conciliation policies has occurred in more 
récent years, with the resuit that since 1972 several jurisdictions hâve 
further modified conciliation provisions to introduce some more or less 
tentative éléments of voluntarism. Thèse hâve generally taken the 
form of allowing the minister the authority to waive the first stage of 
conciliation.4 In Manitoba, conciliation has never been an absolute 
requirement. In British Columbia efforts were made to strengthen 
conciliation and médiation procédures in 1968, followed in 1973 by the 
abandonment of virtually ail compulsory features. Meantime, Alberta5 
has moved in the direction of greater compulsion in récent years. 
2
 Canada, Industriel Relations and Disputes Investigation Act, R.S.C. 1952, Vol. 
III, c. 152. 
Alberta, Labour Act, R.S.A. 1970, Vol. III, c. 196. 
British Columbia, Industriel Conciliation and Arbitration Act, R.S.B.C. 1948, Vol. 
II, c. 155. 
New Brunswick, Labour Relations Act, R.S.N.B. 1954, Vol. II, c. 124. 
Nova Scotia, Trade Union Act, R.S.N.S. 1954, Vol. III, c. 295. 
Ontario, The Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1960, Vol. II, c. 202. 
Québec, Labour Code, R.S.Q., 1964, c. 141. 
3
 For a good discussion of this aspect of conciliation practices, see H. D. 
WOODS, Labour Policy in Canada, 2nd éd., Toronto, Macmillan, 1973, chapter 3. pp. 
43-99. 
4
 See, for example Canada Labour Code, s. 180, New Brunswick Labour 
Relations Act, s. 91 and Newfoundland Labour Relations Act, s. 19. 
5
 See Alberta Labour Act, 1973, s. 104 and s. 125 and compare with R.S.A. 
1970, c. 196, s. 88 and s. 98. 
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It therefore seems clear that policy makers are less than certain 
about the degree of voluntarism which best serves Canadian labour-
management relations. Those who seek greater freedom and those who 
are seeking more restrictive Systems are unlikely both to be right. It is 
of course one thing to demonstrate confusion about the effectiveness 
of conciliation procédures, and quite another to assess the worth of 
compulsory conciliation. This difficulty may explain why little serious 
effort has been made to evaluate our conciliation expérience.6 While 
it is not at présent possible to produce conclusive évidence of the value 
of compulsory conciliation it is the author's belief that for some time 
past it has been possible to find tentative answers to the following 
questions : 
(1) Has compulsory conciliation contributed to labour managemenl 
harmony in Canada? and 
(2) If it has succeeded in promoting harmony hâve the results 
justified the costs ? 
In an attempt to shed light on thèse questions, it seemed te 
make sensé to try to find support for the proposition that a free System 
of conciliation would be (a) more effective and (b) less costly in the 
long run than one that was compulsory. To test this hypothesis, 
required that some method be found to compare the results of free 
and compulsory conciliation Systems over as long a period of time as 
possible. 
We chose as our example of a "free" System the Province of 
Saskatchewan, where access to conciliation was "voluntary" during the 
period under study. Nova Scotia, on the other hand, has a pure 
"compulsory" System of first stage conciliation. In many other respects, 
thèse two provinces can be paired, and seem to offer opportunities for 
isolating conciliation expérience as a phenomenon which can be 
compared. 
Over the period from 1960 to 1975 the two provinces were not 
dissimilar in: population, âge distribution, size of work force, number 
of union members and degree of unionization. While Nova Scotia 
has a larger manufacturing sector, neither province is heavily indus-
trialized, and both dépend heavily on resource based industries such 
as farming, fishing, forestry, and mining. While Saskatchewan's popu-
6
 An exception to this gênerai rule was the paper by W. B. CUNNINGHAM 
at the 6th Annual Meeting of C.R.R.R.I. in 1969 entitled «Conciliation: The End of 
Compulsory Boards ». 
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lation is 25% farmer based, compared with about 3% in Nova Scotia, 
both provinces are more than 50% urban. Wage levels in Saskatchewan 
are generally higher than in Nova Scotia, while unemployment aver-
ages between one half and one third of Nova Scotia's. Climatic 
conditions are distinctly différent. While, therefore, there are significant 
différences between thèse two provinces, the similarities offer some 
hope that comparison is not meaningless. 
As a check on thèse results, data for tho other provinces were 
developed, one western and one maritime. Alberta and New Brunswick 
each offered some variants on conciliation practices. Alberta still 
relies partially on the old two-stage conciliation procès s while New 
Brunswick is close to the Nova Scotia Model, even though the New 
Brunswick Labour Relations Act makes provisions for waiving conci-
liation at the discrétion of the minister. The four provinces studied 
represent, therefore, a range of reliance on compulsory intervention in 
negotiations and seem to provide a basis for making useful comparisons. 
Several measures of "effectiveness" were tried and discarded. 
Since conciliation is designed primarily to avoid bargaining breakdowns 
which lead to work stoppages, it seemed logical to measure the effecti-
veness of each provincial System by the record of "strike-days per 
union member". Thèse data were derived from the Fédéral Department 
of Labour's annual union membership statistics and reports of man 
days lost in each province. Slightly différent results would hâve been 
obtained by using provincial government statistics, but the différences 
are not material. 
A sixteen-year record of strike days per union member (SD/UM) 
appears in Table #1 . A wide search would be unlikely to reveal a more 
inonclusive set of data and yet, as will be shown, it is this very incon-
clusiveness which may lend importance to the figures. Saskatchewan's 
mean SD/UM for the entire period is significantly better than the Nova 
Scotia record and falls about mid-way between New Brunswick and 
Alberta. Without the disastrous 1974 figures, Saskatchewan's 16-year 
average would hâve been better than that of any of the other provinces. 
Saskatchewan has, however, enjoyed a much more rapid growth in 
SD/UM over the period, with mean annual SD/UM for 1971-75 reaching 
1.89, compared with Nova Scotia's 1.88, New Brunswick's 1.45 and 
Alberta's 1.09. Again, thèse unfavourable Saskatchewan results reflect 
the high 1974 figures. 
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Table 1 
Strike Days Lost Per Union Member by Province 
YEAR NOVASCOTIA SASKATCHEWAN NEW BRUNSWICK ALBERTA 
1960 .53 .13 
1961 1.33 .10 
1962 .39 .07 
1963 .30 .21 
1964 .19 .12 
1965 .41 .44 
1966 1.55 .45 
1967 1.25 .21 
1968 .32 .81 
1969 1.46 .65 
1970 3.90 1.04 
1971 1.68 .04 
1972 1.24 1.32 
1973 2.59 .58 
1974 .84 5.34 
1975 3.03 2.16 
Average 
16 years 1.29 .85 
.02 .46 
1.25 .29 
.30 .35 
.45 .37 
.58 .10 
.20 .09 
.58 .68 
.64 .23 
.51 .71 
.28 .73 
.91 .33 
.57 .72 
.94 .20 
1.50 1.14 
1.96 1.25 
2.30 2.14 
.81 .61 
Sources: (1) Economies and Research Branch, Labour Canada, «Industrial and 
Géographie Distribution of Union Membership in Canada » Annual 
Publication, Table 3, «Union Membership by Province». 
(2) Economies and Research Branch, Labour Canada Strikes and Lockouts 
in Canada, 1960-64, Table 3, 1965 FF, Table 4. 
From thèse data, it would be difficult to argue the superiority of 
a free System over one that is compulsory. But, if it is true that the 
free system has not been proved better than the compulsory, the 
opposite is equally true. It requires an act of faith to argue that 
compulsory conciliation in Nova Scotia (or New Brunswick or Alberta) 
saved a single strike day between 1960 and 1975. This is not to say that 
compulsory conciliation has ne ver been useful, but simply that on 
balance the harm it may hâve done has probably cancelled out the 
good. 
If it was difficult to devise a measure of conciliation effectiveness, 
it was nearly impossible to find a meaningful measure of cost which 
was consistent for ail four provinces, or even for the two principal 
provinces studied. No province reports conciliation expense separately 
in its public accounts. The Nova Scotia Department of Labour kindly 
extracted figures for conciliation expense for several years, but since 
comparable figures were not available from any other province, the 
Nova Scotian data was virtually worthless. It therefore became neces-
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sary to rely on what is reported variously as «Labour Relations 
Expense» or «Industrial Relations Expense» in the Public Accounts 
of each province. Thèse expense items include the costs of various 
other services, such as Labour Relations Boards, Industrial Standards, 
etc., but it appears that in ail provinces conciliation expense amounts 
to about two thirds of the Labour Relations Expense budget item. It was 
therefore the actual total Labour (or Industrial) Relations expense 
which, when divided by union membership, yielded the figures for 
Labour Relations Expense per Union Member (LRE/UM) that appear in 
Table #2. At best, this can be viewed only as a very rough approxima-
tion of a measure of conciliation costs, but despite its shortcomings it 
provides some basis for comparison. 
Table #2 reveals striking différences between LRE/UM in Saskat-
chewan and the other provinces. Saskatchewan enjoyed substantially 
lower costs throughout the entire period. Moreover, its costs hâve 
increased the least. From the early 1960's to 1971, LRE/UM rose only 
about 22% in Saskatchewan, while more than doubling in Nova Scotia. 
In New Brunswick the increase was 26% and in Alberta nearly 37%. It 
is more difficult to compare the figures since 1971 because of missing 
data and changes in accounting procédures. It appears, however, that 
with the exception of Alberta ail provinces may hâve experienced a 
slight décline in LRE/UM from 1972 to 1975. 
Because of the dubious nature of the data used for the cost 
comparison it is risky to draw firm conclusions. However, even if one 
were to assume that the Labour Relations Expense budget item in 
Saskatchewan covered nothing but conciliation expense, while only two 
thirds of this item was applied to conciliation expense in the other 
provinces, the Saskatchewan figures would still be impressive. 
It would hâve been encouraging to the anti-législative bias of the 
author if it were possible to report that there is strong évidence that 
the effects of compulsory conciliation hâve been négative and that the 
costs are exorbitant. While no such clearcut results émerge from the 
work which has been done to date, it is significant that there is an equal 
lack of évidence that compulsory conciliation has generally contributed 
to labour management harmony. Furthermore, this absence of positive 
results has been achieved at considérable unecessary cost to the tax-
payer. A widespread, time-consuming and costly habit hardly seems 
justified on the basis of such a nebulous contribution. In fact, the only 
real justification for the continuation of compulsory conciliation is that 
it may be a relatively harmless aberration and is certainly less costly 
than many other more harmful government programmes. 
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Table 2 
Labour Relation Expense Per Union Member by Province 
YEAR NOVA SCOTIA SASKATCHEWAN NEW BRUNSWICK ALBERTA 
1960 1.39 1.25 
1961 1.39 1.25 
1962 1.38 1.12 
1963 1.37 1.31 
1964 1.06 1.34 
1965 1.29 1.62 
1966 1.57 2.05 
1967 1.60 1.43 
1968 1.67 1.80 
1969 2.16 1.96 
1970 2.71 1.52 
1971 3.43 1.53 
1972 3.06 2.38= 
1973 2.98 1.20= 
1974 2.92 1.16= 
1975 ? .89= 
Average 
1960-71 1.67 1.52 
3.24 5.89 
3.01 5.67 
3.29 5.83 
2.67 5.96 
3.53 6.73 
3.20 7.31 
3.27 7.36 
2.88 7.56 
3.07 8.35 
3.23 8.81 
3.79 7.68 
4.09 8.04 
2.84 9.34 
n.a. 9.32 
2.80 9.65' 
2.99 7.97 
3.87 7.10 
Sources: (1) Economies and Research Branch, Labour Canada, Industrial and Géo-
graphie Distribution of Union Membership in Canada, Annual Publication, 
Table 3, «Union Membership by Province». 
(2) Public Accounts of Alberta, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Saskat-
chewan. 
* Changes in accounting procédures make comparisons with previous years of ques-
tionable value. 
Further doubts about the value of compulsory conciliation corne 
from other sources. The first of thèse is the experienced negotiators 
who treat compulsory conciliation with the dérision they feel it deserves. 
It is not unknown for labour and management to agrée mutually to 
dispose of the « conciliation obstacle » early in the negotiation process 
before settling down to serious bargaining. To achieve this end, labour 
and management go through some preliminary skirmishing during which 
they agrée not to agrée. They call for conciliation services, and the 
conciliator, being unable to bring about a seulement, submits his report 
to the minister. The parties then enter into serious negotiations unfet-
tered by any conciliation or strike restrictions. Examples of such 
practices are not documented for obvious reasons, but it is widely 
believed they occur in some major negotiations including those between 
the UAW and Big Three automakers in Ontario. Where this occurs, 
compulsory conciliation becomes not only useless but ridiculous. 
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While such outright défiance of the conciliation process may not 
be widespread, there is no doubt that compulsory conciliation has other 
detrimental effects on good faith bargaining. In almost every set of 
negotiations experienced labour and management negotiators hold back 
some part of their offers so as to hâve concessions in reserve which 
they can surrender when the conciliation officer appears. Thus, 
recourse to conciliation tends to become semi-automatic even in cases 
where the parties could hâve reached a seulement unaided. 
If we look beyond the narrow field of conciliation, there are close 
parallels between compulsory conciliation processes and compulsory 
interest arbitration, since both entail related kinds of forced third-party 
interventions. Most of the literature dealing with compulsory arbitra-
tion8 points to the failures of the process. Where successes hâve been 
claimed for compulsory arbitration, the conditions hâve been so mate-
rially différent from those surrounding conventional compulsory conci-
liation as to make comparison largely meaningless.9 
The weight of the évidence and argument therefore runs against 
compulsory arbitration, not because arbitration is inherently inappro-
priate in interest disputes but because it does not generally appear 
effective when imposed by the state. Some of the arguments against 
compulsory arbitration are similar to those listed above as interfering 
with the effectiveness of compulsory conciliation, e.g., that the parties 
will not bargain in good faith and will develop negotiation stratégies 
which take account of the likelihood of the dispute going before an 
arbitration tribunal.10 
7
 See for instance: RAYMOND D. HORTON, «Arbitration, Arbitrators and 
the Public Interest», Industrial and Labour Relations Review, Vol. 28, No. 4, July 1975, 
pp. 497-507. PETER Z. W. TSONG, «Compulsory Arbitration in British Columbia», 
Industrial Relations, Vol. 11, No. 1, Feb. 1972, pp. 115-117. ROBERT J. HINES, 
«Mandatory Contract Arbitration: Is it a Viable Process?», Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review, Vol. 25, no. 4, Apr. 72. pp. 533-544. JOHN M. HOWELLS, «Causes 
and Frequency of Strikes in New Zealand», Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 
Vol. 25, No. 4, July 1972, pp. 524-532. 
8
 See for instance: JOSEPH R. GRODIN, «Arbitration of Public Sector 
Labor Disputes: The Nevada Experiment», Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 
28, No. 1, October, 1974, pp. 89-102. MARK THOMPSON and JAMES CAIRNIE, 
«Compulsory Arbitration: The Law and British Columbia Teachers», Industrial and 
Labor Relations Review, Vol. 27, No. 1, Oct. 1974, pp. 3-17. 
9
 See: F. WALKER, «Compulsory Arbitration in Australia», in J. Joseph 
Loewenberg et al., Compulsory Arbitration, Toronto, Lexington Books, 1976, p. 37. 
10
 E. WALTON, Interpersonal Peacemaking : Confrontations and Third Party 
Consultations, Reading, Mass. Addison-Wesley, 1969. 
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Systematic research might possibly throw light on the doubts and 
dilemmas created by thèse enquiries into the effectiveness of various 
forms of intervention. Unfortunately, such research has been rare and 
inconclusive. Moreover, there has been no research directly dealing 
with compulsory third-party intervention. Walton11 examines the rôle of 
the third party in interpersonal conflicts through a séries of case 
studies, but his limited sample, anecdotal approach and subjective 
analysis cast doubts on the value of the findings for our purposes. 
Deutsch12 discusses in some depth the rôle of third parties in industrial, 
marital, community and international conflicts, but his analysis also 
dépends on sketchy and largely inconclusive observations bolstered 
by a single set of laboratory experiments. Fisher13 reviews the avail-
able literature and discusses the rôle, identity, objectives and functions 
of third parties. But nowhere do any of thèse authors directly address 
the question of compulsory third party intervention. 
Walton14 does, however, inadvertently provide certain insights 
which are relevant. His care to win from the conflicting parties the 
voluntary acceptance of the third party's mediating rôle, suggests a 
belief in the importance of a lack of compulsion. Freedom, he implies, 
is essential to establishing the legitimacy of the intervention and the 
influence and trustworthiness of the third party. A case cannot, however, 
be built on such a flimsy foundation, and corroboration is sorely. 
Both interested policy makers and students of Canadian industrial 
relations are left in a state of uncertainty and confusion by the 
available information on compulsory third-party intervention. Much of 
what we know suggests, however, that such intervention is, at best, 
of dubious value. Doubts as to its value argue not for abolition of the 
présent System as it exists but for a programme of research and enquiry 
designed to reveal the true situation. There may be a good case for 
policy making by hunch when opportunities for systematic évaluation of 
alternatives are lacking. Where such opportunities are available, how-
ever, and the effectiveness of policy is clearly in doubt, there is no 
excuse for remaining unimformed. What is at issue hère, moreover, is 
something much broader and of more gênerai concern than compulsory 
" MORTON DEUTSCH, The Resolution of Conflict, New Haven, Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1973, pp. 382-388. 
12
 RONALD J. FISHER, «Third Party Consultation: a Method for î.he Study 
and Resolution of Conflict», Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 16, No. 1, Mairch 1972, 
pp. 67-94. 
13
 RICHARD E. WALTON, op. cit., p. 97. 
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conciliation. It is the Canadian propensity for government intervention 
in the labour relations field. If it can be shown that compulsory con-
ciliation is counter-productive, might it not be wise to question other 
aspects of our législative overburden which seriously interfère with the 
freedom of collective bargaining relationships ? Among those aspects it 
might be well to question first are sections of provincial and fédéral 
statutes calling for mandatory «no-strike, no lock out» provisions in 
collective agreements, as well as mandatory grievance arbitration pro-
visions. Many of the complexities in the sections of législation dealing 
with certification, accréditation and decertification, as well as of Labour 
Relations Boards generally, are unnecessary or redundant, with perhaps 
the worst examples of redundancy occurring in the New Brunswick 
Labour Relations Act. Everywhere one looks our statutes cry out for 
simplification and for a réduction of the government's rôle in labour 
management relations. 
This is not to say that governments should hâve no rôle in indus-
trial relations, but rather that the rôle of government should be reduced 
to that minimum which ensures that the public interest will be guarded 
effectively. The fact that Canada has exhibited in the early 1970s a strike 
record worse than that of any industrialized nation except Italy cer-
tainly suggests that there may be something wrong with out System. 
Before we assume that the cure rests in further législative restraints on 
free collective bargaining we would be wise to find out whether the 
existing restraints hâve contributed more to the problem than to the cure. 
La conciliation obligatoire au Canada — 
En avons-nous besoin? 
L'intervention du législateur en matière de relations professionnelles est 
plus répandue au Canada que dans la plupart des autres pays industrialisés de 
l'Ouest. Ce phénomène est de nature à nous intéresser à cause de ses effets 
négatifs sur les négociations collectives, surtout lorsqu'on tient comme des ré-
sultats meilleurs qui ont été obtenus aux États-Unis, en Allemagne et dans 
les pays Scandinaves où l'intervention est moins poussée. 
En tête de liste de cette législation inutile, on trouve la vache sacrée de la 
conciliation obligatoire. L'expérience canadienne de la conciliation obligatoire, 
qui était destinée à l'origine à protéger l'intérêt public dans les relations 
de travail, remonte au commencement du XXe siècle. Les recueils de lois tant 
fédéral que provinciaux, à l'exception d'une seule province, prévoient la con-
ciliation à une ou à deux étapes des négociations. Au cours des dernières 
années, les législateurs y ont apporté certaines modifications, mais, dans l'en-
semble, le système demeure intact. 
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Peu d'efforts ont été faits pour révoquer en doute ou contester la valeur 
du régime de conciliation obligatoire, même s'il semble que, depuis quelque 
temps, on se rend compte de ses effets négatifs sur les rapports entre syndicats 
et employeurs et sur le coût de son efficacité. 
L'article précédent traite de ce sujet en comparant la conciliation volon-
taire que l'on trouve dans la législation du travail de la Saskatchewan au 
système de la conciliation obligatoire qui existe en Nouvelle-Ecosse. L'auteur 
se réfère aussi à l'expérience du Nouveau-Brunswick et de l'Alberta. 
Pour étayer cette comparaison, l'auteur a relevé le nombre de jours de 
grève par membre de syndicat au cours des seize dernières années. Les sta-
tistiques ainsi obtenues ne semblent indiquer aucune supériorité d'un régime 
sur l'autre. Quant à son efficacité en valeur monétaire, il s'appuie sur ce qu'il 
en coûte par adhérent syndical en matière de négociations collectives. Les 
statistiques ainsi trouvées montrent clairement que le système de conciliation 
volontaire l'emporte sur le système de conciliation obligatoire. Toute politique 
qui aboutit à des résultats aussi discutables demande un réexamen approfondi. 
D'autres éléments sont également de nature à faire douter de la valeur 
du système canadien; des tactiques de négociations qui vont à l'encontre 
des buts recherchés, des expériences peu fructueuses d'intervention de tiers en 
qualité de médiateur et certaines études expérimentales portant sur le règlement 
des conflits. Malheureusement, ce qui en ressort reste imprécis et peu concluant. 
Si des recherches ultérieures démontrent que la conciliation obligatoire 
ne donne pas les résultats qu'on en attend, il faudra se poser des questions 
touchant tout l'appareil de l'intervention des gouvernements dans le domaine 
des relations professionnelles et se demander s'il n'y aurait pas intérêt pour 
eux de mettre au rebut une telle superstructure. 
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